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I. INTRODUCTION
Mutual fund investments now constitute 19% of United States
households’ assets and an even more significant fraction of retirement
savings.1 The attempt by Congress and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC or Commission) to regulate mutual fund advisory
fees under section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 19402
(Investment Company Act or Act) has resulted in a wealth of litigation,
the vast majority of which has resulted in decisions upholding the
challenged fees.3 The ninety-three million United States mutual fund

1. INV. CO. INST., 2009 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS
ACTIVITY IN THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 8–9 (2009). At year-end 2008,
U.S.-registered investment companies managed $10.3 trillion in assets. Id. at 8. This
figure represents a $2.6 trillion decline over year-end 2007, due largely to a 40% decline
in major U.S. stock market indexes during the year. Id.
2. Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act is codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-35(b) (2006). See Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-547, § 20, 84 Stat. 1413, 1428–29.
3. See, e.g., James R. Carroll & David S. Clancy, ‘Excessive Fee’ Lawsuits,
NAT’L L.J., May 26, 2008, at 12 (noting that the most recent wave of excessive fee
lawsuits has resulted in multiple rulings in the mutual fund industry’s favor, while
plaintiffs have neither prevailed in court nor garnered any public settlement requiring the
return of advisory fees); John P. Freeman et al., Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: New
Evidence and a Fair Fiduciary Duty Test, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 83, 86 (2008) (“[S]ection
36(b) is impotent in practice. Because of the impractical proof standard for succeeding
in a 36(b) lawsuit, no plaintiff has ever won a fee case brought under section 36(b).”).
But see JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1211 (3d ed.
AND
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investors have a vested interest in advisory fee levels.4 Small fee
differences, cumulated over the life of an investment, can significantly
impact total returns.5 On the other hand, excessive fee litigation imposes
costs on the mutual fund industry,6 and mutual fund directors must
consider the potential for litigation when setting advisory fee schedules.7
In light of plaintiffs’ nearly complete failure to prevail in excessive fee
litigation and the prospect that the more restrictive standard the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals recently proposed may render shareholder
recovery even more difficult,8 a growing body of evidence suggests that
the fiduciary duty imposed by section 36(b) has not adequately protected
mutual fund shareholders from excessive advisory fees.9
Section 36(b) expressly imposes a fiduciary duty on the investment
adviser with respect to payments the adviser receives from the fund in
exchange for advisory services.10 Congress expressly granted investment
2001) (noting that some investment advisers have agreed to prospectively reduce
advisory fees as a condition of settling section 36(b) lawsuits).
4. INV. CO. INST., supra note 1, at 7. In exchange for providing a fund with
facilities, administrative staff, portfolio management, and other services, an investment
adviser charges the fund “an advisory fee based on a percentage of the average daily
value of the [f]und’s net assets.” Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694
F.2d 923, 926 (2d Cir. 1982); see also infra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
5. PETER J. WALLISON & ROBERT E. LITAN, COMPETITIVE EQUITY: A BETTER WAY
TO ORGANIZE MUTUAL FUNDS 74 (2007) (citing JOHN C. BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE
SOUL OF CAPITALISM 161 (2005)) (noting that small advisory fee differences can reduce
an investor’s total gain by 75% over a ten-year period).
6. See Carroll & Clancy, supra note 3, at 12 (“[T]he recent wave of ‘excessive
fee’ cases . . . has imposed significant litigation costs on the mutual fund industry, but it
has not yielded judicial findings corroborating assertions that mutual fund fees are
disproportionate to the services provided.”).
7. See Lori A. Martin & Martin E. Lybecker, It’s Too Early To Disregard the
Gartenberg Factors During Advisory Fee Renewals (May 27, 2008), http://www.wilmerhale.
com/publications/whPubsDetail.aspx?publication=8329 (“[B]oards of directors can
clearly document that they have served as independent watchdogs on the management of
investment companies by continuing to review the nature and quality of the services
provided to the investment company and its shareholders.”).
8. See Grace Carter & Katharine Chao, The Future of Gartenberg: A New
Approach in Evaluating Investment Adviser Fees 3 (May 2008), http://paulhastings.
com/assets/publications/919.pdf?wt.mc_ID=919.pdf (“If other courts do follow [Harris
Associates], the Seventh Circuit’s approach will create greater protection for advisers
against excessive fees claims when their fees are in line with the market.”).
9. See infra Part IV.C.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006) (“[T]he investment adviser of a registered
investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt
of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid by such
registered investment company or by the security holders thereof, to such investment
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company shareholders a private right of action as a means of enforcing
this fiduciary duty.11 However, under the Gartenberg standard employed
by the majority of courts that have evaluated excessive fee claims under
section 36(b),12 no plaintiff has ever successfully demonstrated a breach
of this duty.13 Moreover, the replacement standard recently proposed by
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals does not bode well for the prospect
of plaintiff recovery because it relies on comparisons to other mutual
fund fees prevailing in a market that many commentators condemn as
lacking the level of competition necessary to fundamentally affect
prices.14
Observers of the mutual fund market largely agree that the lack of
competition for advisory services results from a governance structure
riddled with conflicts of interest.15 In short, the investment adviser
establishes a fund, elects its initial board of directors, and provides the
fund with advisory and administrative services.16 The Investment
adviser or any affiliated person of such investment adviser.”). By incorporating the agency
concept of fiduciary duty, section 36(b) obligates an investment adviser to act loyally for
the mutual fund and its shareholders’ benefit in matters related to compensation for
services and other payments paid by the fund or its shareholders to the adviser. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006) (explaining the fiduciary duty in
general); see also S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 6 (1969), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4897, 4902 (“This bill states that the mutual fund investment adviser has a specific
‘fiduciary duty’ in respect to management fee compensation. . . . [It] is in accordance
with the traditional function of the courts to enforce such fiduciary duties in similar type
relationships.”).
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (“An action may be brought under this
subsection . . . by a security holder of such registered investment company . . . against
such investment adviser . . . .”); S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 7, as reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4903 (“Under [section 36(b)] either the SEC or a shareholder may
sue in court on a complaint that a mutual fund’s management fees involve a breach of
fiduciary duty.”).
12. See Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir.
1982). Only the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected the Gartenberg approach
to mutual fund advisory fee litigation. See infra Part IV.C.3.
13. Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 86.
14. See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The
trustees (and in the end investors, who vote with their feet and dollars), rather than a
judge or jury, determine how much advisory services are worth.”), cert. granted, 129 S.
Ct. 1579 (2009). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals intimated that it would find that
an investment adviser had breached its fiduciary duty only if it charged an advisory fee
so unusual that the court might infer “deceit must have occurred.” Id.
15. See, e.g., Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 87–89 (discussing mutual funds’
conflicted management structure).
16. S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 5, as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4901
(“Mutual funds, with rare exception, are not operated by their own employees. Most
funds are formed, sold, and managed by external organizations, that are
separately owned and operated.”). Following the adviser’s election of a mutual fund’s
initial board of directors, the fund’s shareholders may have the opportunity to replace the
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Company Act imposes stringent regulations regarding the board members’
qualifications, mandates that “disinterested”17 directors comprise a
fraction of the board, and governs the directors’ conduct in approving
the advisory services contract.18 Notwithstanding these constraints, the
conflicts of interest inherent in a mutual fund’s governance structure
generally prevent the fund’s board of directors from firing the initial
investment adviser-sponsor in favor of another adviser who might
charge lower fees.19
Although section 36(b) indicates that shareholders may bring an action
against the persons enumerated in section 36(a)20—including investment
company directors21—section 36(b)(3) substantially qualifies that right
by disallowing suits “against any person other than the recipient of such
compensation.”22 A mutual fund’s board of directors derives no

directors “at an annual or a special meeting duly called for that purpose.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-16(a) (2006). However, funds can—and do—dispense with shareholder meetings,
meaning mutual fund directors often do not stand for periodic reelection. See LOUIS
LOWENSTEIN, THE INVESTOR’S DILEMMA: HOW MUTUAL FUNDS ARE BETRAYING YOUR
TRUST AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 81, 169 (2008).
17. “The [Investment Company Act] requires that at least forty percent of
an investment company’s directors be ‘disinterested,’ and that every agreement with an
investment adviser be approved by a majority of the disinterested directors.” Migdal v.
Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 329 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). For
the various categories of relationships that render a director “interested” under 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-2(19), see infra note 44.
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(19), -10(a), -15(c) (2006).
19. See Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d at 631 (“Few mutual funds ever change advisers,
and plaintiffs conclude from this that the market for advisers is not competitive.”); S.
REP. NO. 91-184, at 5, as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4901 (“[A] mutual fund
cannot, as a practical matter[,] sever its relationship with the adviser.”); WALLISON &
LITAN, supra note 5, at 71 (“Unless the advisers themselves face competition from other
advisers . . . the prices they offer to the funds they manage will never reflect the low
costs to investors that competition could produce.”); John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn
Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: Evidence and Implications for
Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151, 159 (2007) (“It is thus a second aspect of the perceived
conflict—one unique to the fund industry—that is crucial to the critics’ belief that
advisory fees are unconstrained by competition. This second aspect is based on the
empirical fact that mutual fund boards of directors rarely ‘fire’ advisers and do not put
advisory contracts up for bid among advisers—which we do not dispute.”).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006).
21. Id. § 80a-35(a)(1).
22. Id. § 80a-35(b)(3); see Pfeiffer v. Integrated Fund Servs., 371 F. Supp. 2d 502,
509–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing excessive fee complaint against fund officers when
plaintiff failed to allege that fund officers received administrative or transfer agent fees);
Tarlov v. Paine Webber Cashfund, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 429, 436 (D. Conn. 1983) (“Only
the recipient of the allegedly excessive compensation can be sued.”).
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beneficial compensation from an excessive advisory fee.23 Accordingly,
shareholders have no cause of action under the Investment Company Act
against mutual fund boards of directors that approve excessive advisory
fee contracts.24 Thus, one can reasonably argue that fund directors have
little incentive to faithfully fulfill their fiduciary duties to fund
shareholders by bargaining at arm’s length with the investment adviser
when the advisory contract comes up for approval.25
Two conclusions are especially relevant to the issue of investment
adviser compensation. First, the insurmountable burden of proof that the
Gartenberg test imposes has universally prevented plaintiff shareholder
recovery in excessive fee actions brought under section 36(b).26 Second,
mutual funds’ conflicted governance structure has stifled competition
and allowed investment advisers to continue charging exorbitant
advisory fees.27 As a solution, this Comment proposes that Congress
and the Commission implement a system of penalty default rules aimed
at fostering more efficient arm’s length negotiation between fund

23. See, e.g., In re Dreyfus Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 428 F. Supp. 2d 342, 351–52
(W.D. Pa. 2005) (dismissing section 36(b) claims when plaintiffs’ only allegation
regarding payments to directors consisted of claim that directors received excessively
high salaries); Jerozal v. Cash Reserve Mgmt., Inc., No. 81 Civ. 1569, 1982 WL 1363, at
*6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1982) (“[T]he numerous parties subject to liability under section
36(b) are only liable for receipt of compensation or payments for investment advisory
services.”).
24. Section 36(a) of the Act authorizes the SEC to bring civil actions against
mutual fund board members who “engage in any act or practice constituting a breach of
fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct.” 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (2006). Although
courts have historically recognized an implied right of action under section 36(a),
modern courts have reversed course, holding that Congress did not intend to create a
private cause of action in enacting section 36(a). Compare Strougo ex rel. Braz. Fund,
Inc. v. Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 783, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(recognizing a private right of action under section 36(a)), with Olmsted v. Pruco Life
Ins. Co., 283 F.3d 429, 433 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Congress’s explicit provision of a private
right of action to enforce [section 36(b)] suggests that omission of an explicit private
right to enforce other sections was intentional.”). See generally Arthur S. Gabinet &
George M. Gowen III, The Past and Future of Implied Causes of Action Under the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 3 VILL. J.L. & INVESTMENT MGMT. 45 (2002).
Moreover, some courts have held that section 36(b) provides an exclusive remedy with
respect to excessive advisory fee claims, thereby preempting excessive advisory fee
claims brought under other sections of the Act. See Merine ex rel. Prudential-Bache
Util. Fund, Inc. v. Prudential-Bache Util. Fund, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 715, 723 (S.D.N.Y.
1994); Tarlov, 559 F. Supp. at 436 (declining to imply causes of action to recover
excessive advisory fees under sections 1(b)(2), 15(a), 15(b), and 36(a) of the Act).
25. Often, mutual fund directors hold only nominal personal stakes in the funds
they manage. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 16, at 76. Accordingly, many mutual fund
directors have little personal financial incentive to keep advisory fees in check.
26. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
27. See discussion infra Part IV.A–B.
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directors and investment advisers, as well as encouraging investment
advisers to effectively compete on price.28
Part II of this Comment provides a brief introduction to mutual funds,
the fund-investment adviser relationship, and the regulation of this
relationship under the Investment Company Act. Part III outlines the
problem of excessive mutual fund advisory fees and provides some
contemporary evidence suggesting that advisory fees remain excessive
despite regulatory efforts. Part IV discusses mutual funds’ conflicted
governance structure, the lack of competition in the mutual fund market,
and section 36(b)’s impotent shareholder remedy—all of which have
served to perpetuate excessive advisory fees. Finally, Part V offers a
proposal to implement a penalty default regime aimed at encouraging
arm’s length negotiation between investment advisers and mutual funds’
independent directors. Part V concludes by suggesting a more reserved
proposal intended to introduce the mutual fund market to default rules’
efficacy.
II. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO MUTUAL FUNDS
An astonishing one-third of American families invest some portion of
their savings in open-end investment companies—more commonly
known as mutual funds.29 Mutual funds give investors the option to
purchase shares in pools of assets, generally including cash, securities, and
securities options.30 This unique structure provides smaller, individual
investors with access to portfolio diversification and professional advisory

28. For a discussion of penalty default rules, see infra Part V.A.1. Default rules
are a powerful component of libertarian paternalist regulation. See RICHARD H. THALER
& CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND
HAPPINESS 83, 85 (2008). The libertarian paternalist movement aims to allow entities to
make their own choices, while simultaneously attempting to influence those entities’
behavior in order to ensure that they make the most efficient, wealth-maximizing
choices. See id. at 5.
29. MUTUAL FUND REGULATION § 1:1 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 2d ed. 2009); see
also INV. CO. INST., supra note 1, at 7 (indicating that mutual funds have over ninety
million investors in the United States).
30. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 20.1 (6th ed.
2009).
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services.31 By the end of 2008, mutual funds in the United States held
combined assets of over ten trillion dollars.32
Mutual fund shareholders rely on the prudent advice of investment
advisers, who recommend to a fund’s board of directors where to invest
the company’s assets.33 Additionally, a fund’s adviser generally
manages the fund’s portfolio transactions and employs all of the staff
assigned to a particular fund.34 In exchange for its services, the
investment adviser takes a fee calculated as a percentage of the fund’s
total assets.35
A. The Investment Company Act of 1940
This section outlines Congress’s effort to regulate investment
advisers’ compensation through the Investment Company Act. As the
discussion below will show, Congress has tried to regulate advisory fees
indirectly—by setting the qualifications for mutual fund directors and
specifying procedures for approving advisory services contracts—and
directly through shareholder litigation under section 36(b).36
Originally, mutual funds—generally organized as corporations or
business trusts37—were subject only to the laws of their state of

31. WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 5, at 1.
32. INV. CO. INST., supra note 1, at 9; see also supra note 1 (noting this figure
represents a $2.6 trillion decline over year-end 2007).
33. HAZEN, supra note 30, § 20.2; Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 84 (“[The]
portfolio management function is the single most important service performed for
actively managed mutual funds.”).
34. MUTUAL FUND REGULATION, supra note 29, § 1:2.2; see also S. REP. NO. 91184, at 5 (1969), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4901 (“[A] typical
[management] fund is organized by its investment adviser which provides it with almost
all management services . . . .”).
35. MUTUAL FUND REGULATION, supra note 29, § 1:2.2. Under a typical advisory
fee schedule, the adviser charges a fee calculated as a percentage of net assets. See id.
§ 7:2.3. The adviser’s fee typically decreases as the mutual fund’s net asset value
increases. See id. (noting that fee schedules use “breakpoints” as a means of passing on
economies of scale generated as total assets increase). For example, a typical investment
adviser might charge 0.60% of the first $1 billion in total assets, 0.575% of the next
billion dollars in total assets, and so on, scaling down to 0.48% of total assets over $24
billion. Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d 974, 977 (D. Minn. 2007)
(describing the fee schedule of American Express Funds’ Large Cap Equity Fund and
New Dimensions Fund), rev’d, 561 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 2009).
36. Direct regulation consists of ex post sanctions imposed when the regulated
entity fails to comply with the law. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27
J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662 (1998). In contrast, indirect regulation “regulates . . . other
regulators so that they regulate the individual differently.” Id. at 666.
37. See MUTUAL FUND REGULATION, supra note 29, § 6:7.
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incorporation.38 After widespread abuses in the investment company
industry came to light in the wake of the Great Depression, Congress
and the SEC adopted the Investment Company Act to regulate the
conduct of mutual fund operators.39
The Investment Company Act imposes a complex and comprehensive
regulatory scheme on mutual funds.40 Aside from the fiduciary duty
contained in section 36(b), two categories of regulations bear
substantially on the issue of adviser compensation: regulations governing
mutual fund boards of directors and regulations governing the advisory
contract.41
1. Regulation of Directors
Although investment advisers typically manage mutual funds’ day-today operations, mutual funds, like all corporations, have boards of
directors that oversee the investment adviser and otherwise represent
shareholders’ interests.42 Recognizing that the close relationship
between mutual funds and their investment advisers might produce
unreasonable fee structures, in 1970, Congress adopted independent
director requirements to limit the potential conflicts of interest that might
arise in the advisory contract approval process.43 Accordingly, under
section 10(a) of the Investment Company Act, “interested persons”44
38. See Philip H. Newman, Boards of Directors of Registered Investment
Companies, in INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE 373, 375 (Am.
Law Inst.-Am. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Continuing Leadership in Prof’l Educ. ed., 2008)
(indicating investment companies are “creature[s] of state law” also subject to
the Investment Company Act).
39. See MUTUAL FUND REGULATION, supra note 29, § 1:1.
40. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2006).
41. For sections of the Investment Company Act regulating mutual fund boards of
directors, see, for example, id. § 80a-2(a)(19) (defining “interested person”); id. § 80a-10
(regulating affiliations or interest of directors, officers, and employees); id. § 80a-16
(regulating boards of directors). 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 governs contracts of investment
advisers and underwriters.
42. AM. BAR ASS’N, FUND DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK 5 (3d ed. 2006).
43. See Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 537–38 (1984) (“In order to
remedy . . . perceived inadequacies in the [1940] Act, the SEC submitted a series of
legislative proposals to Congress that led to the 1970 Amendments to the Act.” (explaining
the additions of 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-10(a), -15(c))).
44. Section 2(a)(19) defines “interested persons” to include: (1) persons affiliated
with the fund; (2) persons with family members affiliated with the fund; (3) interested
persons of the fund’s investment adviser or principal underwriter; (4) persons employed
by the fund within the preceding two fiscal years; (5) persons who, within the preceding
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may comprise no more than 60% of a mutual fund’s board of directors.45
The Supreme Court has emphasized the “watchdog” role played by
mutual funds’ disinterested directors, noting that “Congress entrusted to
the independent directors of investment companies . . . the primary
responsibility for looking after the interests of the funds’ shareholders.”46
2. Regulation of the Advisory Contract
The independent directors’ responsibility to mutual fund shareholders
has marked relevance in the advisory contract approval context, as the
approval or renewal of any advisory contract requires a majority vote of
a fund’s disinterested directors.47 As a baseline, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)
specifies that the advisory contract must be in writing and must precisely
describe all compensation paid to the adviser under the contract.48
Mutual fund boards of directors must request and evaluate any
information necessary to assess the terms of the advisory contract, and
the investment adviser has a duty to furnish such relevant information.49
Subsequent judicial interpretation confirms the status of these provisions
as more than mere formalities; shareholders may bring a federal claim
alleging that a fund’s board has failed to comply with statutory
procedures governing the advisory contract approval process.50
3. Section 36(b)
In the mid-1960s, responding to concerns stemming from the
significant growth within the mutual fund industry, the SEC concluded
that disinterested directors, mandated disclosure, and other procedural
requirements could not adequately protect mutual fund shareholders
from excessive advisory fees.51 Accordingly, Congress amended the

two fiscal years, have had a “material business or professional relationship” with the fund, its
principal executive officer, or other funds with the same investment adviser or principal
executive officer. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A).
45. Id. § 80a-10(a); see also LOWENSTEIN, supra note 16, at 81, 169 (noting mutual
fund directors often do not stand for periodic reelection).
46. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1979).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2006). Although a mutual fund’s shareholders may
annually approve the adviser’s contract, see id. § 80a-15(a)(2), “[i]n practice, the contract is
renewed by the directors, not the shareholders (which is a costly and cumbersome
alternative),” MUTUAL FUND REGULATION, supra note 29, § 6:2.2.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (2006).
49. Id. § 80a-15(c).
50. Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 420–21 (2d Cir. 1961).
51. SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R.
REP. NO. 89-2337, at 12 (1966) (“The disclosure requirements of the Federal securities
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Investment Company Act in 1970 to add section 36(b),52 which imposes
a fiduciary duty on the investment advisers of SEC-registered
investment companies to protect mutual fund shareholders from fee
gouging.53
Put simply, section 36(b) forbids investment advisers from charging
and collecting excessive investment advisory fees relative to the services
provided.54 As an enforcement mechanism, the statute grants fund
shareholders an express private right of action against the investment
adviser.55 The plaintiff in a section 36(b) action bears the burden of
proving a breach of fiduciary duty.56 Although section 36(b) does not
provide specific standards for evaluating the size of the adviser’s fee, the
statute directs courts to defer to the investment company’s board’s
approval of the advisory contract to the extent that the circumstances
warrant.57 Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Gartenberg
v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management aptly described section 36(b)’s
legislative history as “tortuous,”58 one point is beyond dispute—
Congress enacted the section out of concern regarding the conflicts of
interest inherent in mutual funds’ governance structure.59

laws . . . [are] a less effective restraint on managerial compensation in this industry
than . . . in other industries. . . . [A]dditional regulatory provisions for advisory fees . . .
which mainly require approval of advisory contracts by shareholders and unaffiliated
directors, have rarely operated to provide fund shareholders with an adequate share of
the economies of size in many cases.”).
52. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat.
1413.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006).
54. HAZEN, supra note 30, § 20.9.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b); see In re Nuveen Fund Litig., No. 94 C 360, 1996 WL
328006, at *13 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 1996) (“[Section] 36(b) provided shareholders with an
express cause of action against the investment adviser that by-passed demand on the
directors.” (citing Daily Income Ins. Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 446 U.S. 523, 535 (1984))).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(1).
57. Id. § 80a-35(b)(2).
58. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir.
1982).
59. See S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 2 (1969), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897,
4898 (“[Y]our committee has adopted the basic principle that, in view of the potential
conflicts of interest involved in the setting of [advisory] fees, there should be effective
means for the courts to act where mutual fund shareholders or the SEC believe there has
been a breach of fiduciary duty.”).
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III. EVIDENCE OF EXCESSIVE FEES
Nearly fifty years ago, Congress realized that investment advisers
charged advisory fees disproportionate to the value of the services
rendered.60 This section provides an overview of the evidence that led
Congress to grant a private right of action to mutual fund investors
affected by excessive advisory fees. In addition, this section argues that
mutual fund advisory fees remain excessive today, as evidenced by the
disparity between mutual fund and pension fund advisory fees.
In the early 1960s, investment company industry observers recognized
that mutual funds’ conflicted management structure created an
opportunity for investment advisers to overreach with respect to their
fees.61 In 1958, the SEC authorized the University of Pennsylvania’s
Wharton School of Finance (Wharton School) to conduct a study of the
mutual fund market.62 At the SEC’s direction, the Wharton School
produced the influential Wharton Report—the most thorough analysis of
the relationships among institutional actors in the mutual fund market of
its time.63 Based on a questionnaire distributed to 163 investment
advisers with mutual fund clients, the Wharton Report found that, in
absolute terms, mutual fund investors paid higher advisory fees than the
advisers’ other clients.64 The Wharton Report also observed that, despite
the likely emergence of economies of scale and lower per shareholder
costs as mutual fund assets increased, investment advisers failed to pass
on any such savings to shareholders.65 The Wharton Report posited that
conflicts of interest inherent in mutual funds’ governance structure—the
close relationship between fund directors and investment advisers—
distorted the normal operation of arm’s length negotiation and prevented
market forces from pressuring advisory fees down to the levels present
in the non-mutual fund context.66
60. See WHARTON SCH. OF FIN. & COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R.
REP. NO. 87-2274 (1962).
61. See id.
62. SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R.
REP. NO. 89-2337, at 2–3 (1966).
63. H.R. REP. NO. 87-2274, at v; see Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 103
(describing the Wharton Report as “the first detailed and comprehensive study raising
questions about the reasonableness of mutual fund fees”).
64. H.R. REP. NO. 87-2274, at 430, 489. The advisers’ other clients included all
clients other than mutual funds, from small individual shareholder accounts to larger
accounts. See id. at 481, 489. Nearly half of the advisers—twenty-four of fifty-four—
with both mutual fund and non-mutual fund clients charged their mutual fund clients two
or more times as much as they did their non-mutual fund clients. Id. at 489.
65. Id. at 28–29.
66. See id. at 493–94.

196

[VOL. 47: 185, 2010]

Nudging Mutual Fund Fees Downward
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

In 1966, the SEC largely adopted the Wharton Report’s conclusions,
recommended that Congress amend the Investment Company Act to
impose a standard of reasonableness on fees received by investment
advisers,67 and suggested a number of factors that Congress should take
into account in evaluating advisory fee structures.68 In 1970, Congress
responded by enacting the aforementioned section 36(b), which imposed
a fiduciary duty on investment advisers as opposed to the reasonableness
standard proposed by the SEC.69 Despite this legislative attempt to
regulate advisory fees, the conditions that persisted in the 1960s—
significant disparities between mutual fund and non-mutual fund
advisory fees—continue today.
67. H.R. REP. NO. 89-2337, at 13. The SEC Report actually recommended that the
Investment Company Act be amended to provide that “[a]ll compensation received by
any person affiliated with a registered investment company . . . for services furnished to
the investment company be reasonable.” Id. The SEC would have applied this limitation not
only to investment advisers’ compensation, but to directors’, trustees’, and underwriters’
compensation as well. Id. Ultimately, however, the 1970 amendments only imposed a
fiduciary duty on investment advisers. See Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 36, 84 Stat. 1413, 1428–30.
68. H.R. REP. NO. 89-2337, at 13. The factors the SEC suggested included:
[T]he fees paid for comparable services by other financial institutions engaged
in administering pools of investment capital of like size and purpose . . . ; the
nature and quality of the services provided; all benefits directly or indirectly
received by persons affiliated with an investment company . . . by virtue of
their relationship with the investment company; and such competitive or other
factors as the Commission may . . . determine are appropriate and material in
the public interest . . . .
Id.
69. See S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 6 (1969), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897,
4902 (“[Y]our committee has decided that there is an adequate basis to delete the express
statutory requirement of ‘reasonableness,’ and to substitute a different method of testing
management compensation. This bill states that the mutual fund investment adviser has
a specific ‘fiduciary duty’ in respect to management fee compensation.”). This change
in section 36(b)’s language came as a result of objections to the proposed reasonableness
language on the part of the mutual fund industry. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset
Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982). Bills that would have amended the
Investment Company Act to impose the SEC’s proposed reasonableness standard failed
to win passage. See S. 3724, 90th Cong. (1968); S. 1659, 90th Cong. (1967); H.R. 9511,
90th Cong. (1967); H.R. 9510, 90th Cong. (1967). Courts interpreting section 36(b)’s
legislative history have read the rejection of these measures to imply that the version of
section 36(b) that Congress eventually enacted entailed something other than a review
for reasonableness. See Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928 (“[T]he legislative history of
[section] 36(b) indicates that the substitution of the term ‘fiduciary duty’ for ‘reasonable,’
while possibly intended to modify the standard somewhat, was a more semantical than
substantive compromise, shifting the focus slightly from the fund directors to
the conduct of the investment adviser-manager.”).
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A. Modern Evidence of Excessive Fees:
The Mutual Fund-Pension Fund Dichotomy
Legislative checks on advisory fees notwithstanding, mutual fund
management fees and operating expenses grew 2400-fold in the period
between 1950 and 2004, despite an only 1600-fold growth in mutual
fund net assets.70 Perhaps the most striking evidence that mutual fund
advisory fees remain excessive is the substantial discrepancy between
fees that investment advisers charge to pension fund clients71 and fees
that those same advisers charge to mutual fund clients.72
The advisory fees paid by the California Public Employees’
Retirement System (Calpers), one of the few pension funds to fully
disclose what it pays its investment advisers, provide a useful example
of this inequality.73 In 2002, Calpers paid three advisory firms an
average of 0.08% of net assets to manage three portfolios of assets with
an average size of $720 million.74 During the same period, the same
three advisory firms charged an average of 0.61% of net assets to
manage three mutual funds with similar portfolios and an average of $12
billion in net assets.75 Such disparities are commonplace,76 despite the
fact that one would expect the emergence of economies of scale to
render larger mutual funds actually less expensive to manage than
smaller pension funds.77

70. BOGLE, supra note 5, at 154–55.
71. For ease of reference, this Comment generally refers to pension funds as an
example of clients who pay lower advisory fees as a result of the ability to purchase
advisory fees on the free market in arm’s length transactions. The same claim also applies to
other institutional investors, including “endowment funds, trusts, separate accounts, and
even mutual funds that hire sub-advisers.” Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 141.
72. See, e.g., BOGLE, supra note 5, at 199–200; Freeman et al., supra note 3, at
106–17; John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: The Cost of
Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609, 627–36 (2001).
73. BOGLE, supra note 5, at 199–200.
74. Id. at 199.
75. Id.
76. For example, in 2002, the Alliance Premier Growth Fund paid its adviser and
sponsor Alliance Capital an advisory fee of $88 million—approximately 0.90% of the
fund’s net assets (90 basis points). Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 110–11. During the
same period, Alliance managed pension funds and other noncaptive funds for between
10 and 24 basis points. Id. at 111. Alliance’s public disclosures indicated that the same
professionals managed both groups of funds according to similar investment strategies.
Id. at 111–12.
77. See, e.g., WHARTON SCH. OF FIN. & COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS,
H.R. REP. NO. 87-2274, at 492 (1962) (“[S]hareholders of open-end companies do not
require individual portfolio attention, as other clients usually do, so that a single quarterly
compilation of portfolio holdings, for example, is all that is required for the aggregate of
shareholders, whether they be a dozen or a million. This characteristic of investment
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Courts and commentators advance a number of theories to explain the
gap between mutual fund and pension fund advisory fees.78 In section
36(b) actions, plaintiffs commonly point to the difference between a
challenged mutual fund advisory fee and pension fund advisory fees
charged by the same investment adviser as prima facie evidence of the
mutual fund advisory fee’s unreasonableness.79 Perhaps the most
common justification courts cite for summarily rejecting this comparison
is the alleged “liquidity difference” between mutual funds and pension
funds—the claim that mutual funds cost more to manage because their
advisers must hold assets in more expensive, highly liquid investment
vehicles to facilitate frequent redemptions.80 However, this alleged
liquidity difference is “something of a financial Loch Ness monster”—
although it exists in theory, it has yet to be observed in practice.81 In
fact, the Investment Company Institute, a mutual fund industry group,
has suggested that the true cost of providing management services to a
mutual fund is comparable to the cost of providing management services

companies suggests the greater likelihood of the emergence of economies of scale and
lower costs with increases in asset size than where clients must be catered to on a more
individualized basis.”).
78. See, e.g., Coates & Hubbard, supra note 19, at 185 (citing services investment
advisers must provide to mutual funds but not to pension funds).
79. See, e.g., Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., No. 04 C 8305, 2007 WL 627640, at *8
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2007) (“[Plaintiffs] insist that we must compare Harris’s fees not to
those charged to funds run by managers other than Harris but rather to those charged to
institutional clients.”), aff’d, 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1579
(2009); Hunt v. Invesco Funds Group, Inc., No. H-04-02555, 2006 WL 1581846, at *3
(S.D. Tex. June 5, 2006); Strigliabotti v. Franklin Res., Inc., No. C 04-00883 SI, 2005
WL 645529, at *34 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2005) (holding that plaintiff mutual fund
shareholders stated a claim under section 36(b) by demonstrating, inter alia, that the
defendant-adviser charged a lower fee for similar services provided to a state pension
fund); Strougo v. BEA Assocs., 188 F. Supp. 2d 373, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Kalish v.
Franklin Advisers, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1222, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). But see Gallus v.
Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d 816, 824 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Indeed, the argument for
comparing mutual fund advisory fees with the fees charged to institutional accounts is
particularly strong in this case because the investment advice may have been essentially
the same for both accounts.”).
80. See, e.g., Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d at 634 (“Harris Associates charges a lower
percentage of assets to other clients, but this does not imply that it must be charging too
much to the Oakmark funds. Different clients call for different commitments of time.
Pension funds have low (and predictable) turnover of assets. Mutual funds may grow or
shrink quickly and must hold some assets in high-liquidity instruments to facilitate
redemptions. That complicates an adviser’s task.”).
81. Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 115; see id. at 113–14 (“[T]his liquidity factor
tends not to be visible or quantifiable in the real world.”).
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to a pension fund.82 Nevertheless, on average, mutual fund investors pay
approximately twice as much for advisory services as do pension fund
investors.83
IV. CAUSES OF EXCESSIVE MUTUAL FUND ADVISORY FEES
The disparity between mutual fund and pension fund advisory fees,
and the more general problem of excessive mutual fund advisory fees,
cannot be solved by pointing to a single discrete issue; rather, a
confluence of factors has allowed investment advisers to charge fees to
their mutual fund clients representing several times what they charge to
their pension fund clients for essentially the same services.84 This Part
discusses three aspects of the mutual fund industry and its regulation,
and examines the adverse impact of these factors on mutual fund
advisory fees. Specifically, this Part demonstrates that an industry-wide
governance structure that impedes arm’s length negotiation between
advisers and directors, a lack of price competition in the mutual fund
market, and section 36(b)’s impotent shareholder remedy for excessive
fees allow investment advisers to charge advisory fees that a market free
of these characteristics would not allow.
A. Mutual Funds’ Conflicted Governance Structure:
A Failure To Negotiate
Conflicts of interest inherent in most mutual funds’ governance
structures have served to perpetuate excessive advisory fees.85 A typical
mutual fund or mutual fund complex is established by an external
82. See id. at 113–15 (citing Sean Collins, The Expenses of Defined Benefit
Pension Plans and Mutual Funds, INVESTMENT COMPANY INST. PERSP., Dec. 2003, at 8,
http://www.ici.org/pdf/per09-06.pdf); see also Freeman & Brown, supra note 72, at 634
(“There is no evidence that managers of public pension fund equity portfolios are paid
less than equity [mutual] fund managers because they do less work or perform at a lower
level.”).
83. See Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 106 (discussing a study that found that
mutual fund managers received an advisory fee of 56 basis points, compared to pension
fund managers’ 28 basis points, to manage mutual funds that averaged three times the
size of their pension fund counterparts).
84. See, e.g., BOGLE, supra note 5, at 199–200 (citing several possible explanations
for the disparity between mutual fund and pension fund advisory fees).
85. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 5 (1969), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4897, 4901 (noting that, because of the unique structure of the investment adviser-mutual
fund relationship, the forces of arm’s length bargaining do not operate in the mutual fund
industry in the same manner as in other sectors of the economy); see also Caroline J.
Dillon, Do You Get What You Pay for? A Look at the High Fees and Low Protections of
Mutual Funds, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 281, 308.
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investment management firm, which incorporates the fund, registers the
fund with the SEC, appoints the fund’s initial board of directors, and
serves as the fund’s initial investment adviser.86 The management firm
unilaterally determines how it will be compensated for these tasks.87
The manager also contracts to provide the fund with investment
advisory, marketing, and administrative services.88 Management firms
tend not to relinquish their control of funds over time, and funds’
directors rarely—if ever—fire a manager in favor of another firm that
can provide comparable investment advisory services more cheaply.89
That this symbiotic investment adviser-mutual fund relationship
redounds to the detriment of mutual fund shareholders in the form of
increased advisory fees is an empirically demonstrable fact.90 Close ties
between mutual fund boards of directors and investment advisers
correlate with higher advisory fees, induce boards to monitor advisers
less closely than they otherwise might, and negatively affect fund
performance—at least marginally.91 Simply put, a mutual fund’s

86. Freeman & Brown, supra note 72, at 614–15. More often than not, the
nominally disinterested directors appointed by the management firm also serve as
directors of other mutual funds administered by the management firm. See, e.g., Krantz
v. Fid. Mgmt. & Research, Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d 150, 152 (D. Mass. 2000) (noting that
nine members of the twelve-member board of directors of Fidelity Management and
Research Company’s (Fidelity) mutual fund complex also served on the boards of all
237 mutual funds to which Fidelity provided investment advisory services).
87. BOGLE, supra note 5, at 172 (“The management company operates the fund,
distributes its shares, and supervises and directs its investment portfolio. It unilaterally
determines at the outset what fees it will charge.”).
88. Freeman & Brown, supra note 72, at 615.
89. Id.; see, e.g., S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 5, as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4897, 4901.
90. See Camelia M. Kuhnen, Business Networks, Corporate Governance and
Contracting in the Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J. FIN. 2185, 2219 (2009) (noting, however,
that the overall economic effect of the adviser-board connections is small);
Memorandum from Chester Spatt, Chief Economist, SEC, Office of Econ. Analysis
(Dec. 29, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70304/oeamemo 122906litreview.pdf.
91. Kuhnen, supra note 90, at 2216.
This discussion of the investment adviser-mutual fund conflict leaves aside another
negative consequence of the conflict—mutual fund directors’ failure to monitor
investment advisers. This breakdown produced the late trading and market timing
scandals that came to light in 2003, along with other wrongdoing. See HAZEN, supra
note 30, § 20.5 (discussing late trading and market timing scandals); see also BOGLE,
supra note 5, at 145–47 (discussing examples of abusive mutual fund trading practices).
These scandals had the immediate effect of transferring wealth out of the hands of
ordinary investors to other investors favored by managers. See id. at 150.
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independent directors do not negotiate with the investment adviser at
arm’s length on behalf of the fund, leading to high advisory fees—and
high profit margins—for the investment adviser.92 The disparity
between mutual fund advisory fees and pension fund advisory fees
provides ample evidence of this fact.93 As discussed in greater detail
above, investment advisers charge pension funds approximately half of
what they charge mutual funds for comparable advisory services.94 This
discrepancy results, at least in part, from the simple fact that pension
funds purchase advisory services in arm’s length transactions on the free
market, whereas mutual funds effectively have no choice but to contract
with their adviser-manager.95

One of the most egregious examples of wrongdoing—which fund managers likely
could have averted through judicious oversight—involved the purchase by Alfred Harrison, a
mutual fund manager with Alliance Capital Management (Alliance), of almost 43 million
shares of Enron stock, including greater than $120 million in purchases in the months
leading up to firm’s downfall. See Benak ex rel. Alliance Premier Growth Fund v.
Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., 435 F.3d 396, 398–99 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[I]n October and
November 2001, as the reports of Enron’s worsening financial state increased, appellees
continued to invest in the company.”). In exchange for Harrison and Alliance’s advice—
which led to a $5 billion decrease in net assets for the fiscal year that ended November
30, 2001—the Alliance Premier Growth Fund paid a $135 million advisory fee. Alliance
Premier Growth Fund, Inc., Annual Report (Form N-30D), at 13–14 (Nov. 30, 2001).
Although the Alliance Premier Growth Fund was not the only mutual fund to feel the
sting of Enron’s collapse, it had the dubious distinction of being the only fund to share a
common director—Frank Savage—with the failed energy conglomerate. Reed Abelson
& Kenneth N. Gilpin, 2 Enron Roles Raise Questions of Allegiance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
2001, at C1. The Third Circuit ultimately dismissed a shareholder derivative suit against
Alliance as untimely. Benak, 435 F.3d at 403. However, many shareholders and industry
observers raised questions regarding the propriety of Savage’s apparent conflict of
interest. See Abelson & Gilpin, supra.
92. See BOGLE, supra note 5, at 172–73; Freeman & Brown, supra note 72, at
617–18.
93. See Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 141–42.
94. See supra notes 70–83 and accompanying text.
95. See Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 140–41 (“Because the [mutual] fund market
features prices drawn from negotiation where one party (the fund) is under compulsion
to buy from only one supplier (the adviser), mutual fund fees negotiated between captive
funds and their adviser, whether considered individually or collectively, cannot reflect
fair market value . . . .”). Thus, the investment adviser-mutual fund relationship is
analogous to a bilateral monopoly—a market in which there exists only one buyer and
one seller. Scott R. Peppet, Contract Formation in Imperfect Markets: Should We Use
Mediators in Deals?, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 283, 302 (2004). Bilateral
monopolies favor the party who possesses greater bargaining power, and the party who is
most able to impose costs on the other side—while simultaneously absorbing costs
imposed by the other side—captures a greater share of the available gains. See id. at 302
& n.65.
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B. Competition in the Mutual Fund Market
Closely related to mutual funds’ conflicted governance structure is the
fact that ordinary forces of market competition have failed to protect
mutual fund shareholders from excessive advisory fees.96 Contrary to
Judge Easterbrook’s reasoning in Harris Associates, as well as the
assertions of mutual fund trade groups, the mutual fund market simply
does not exhibit the vigorous price competition necessary to drive down
advisory fees to levels near their fair market value.97 According to a
recent study conducted by the American Enterprise Institute, the mutual
fund industry exhibits a low degree of concentration and “should be one
of the most competitive [industries] in the country.”98 Barriers to new
firm entry are low, and mutual fund investors can—and do—move from
fund to fund without incurring significant transactions costs.99 Yet, a
review of mutual fund advisory fees demonstrates that substantial price
dispersion exists despite a general lack of differentiation among products
and services.100
In a truly competitive market, absent significant differentiation among
available products, one would expect prices for advisory services to
group more tightly around the mean because advisers could not charge
advisory fees markedly higher than the marginal cost of providing
portfolio management services.101 Commentators have suggested that
advisory fees remain high despite other hallmarks of competition
because the mutual fund market allows fund managers to compete
aggressively for new sales while simultaneously sheltering extraordinarily

96. See Dillon, supra note 85, at 308 (“Market mechanisms, though reliable for
regulation of prices in many other contexts, are not a reasonable alternative for the
regulation of mutual fund fees because conflicts of interest between the board of
directors and the investment adviser prevent true arm’s length negotiations.”).
97. See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 634 (7th Cir. 2008) (arguing
that mutual funds compete on price and that the mutual fund market displays hallmarks
of atomistic competition), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1579 (2009); INV. CO. INST., supra
note 1, at 61 (“[M]utual fund fees have been pushed down by . . . competition within the
mutual fund industry.”).
98. WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 5, at 48 (observing that the mutual fund
industry’s Herfindahl-Hirschman index—the measure of industry concentration favored
by federal antitrust regulators—stands at 400, well within the “unconcentrated” category).
99. Id. at 48–49; Coates & Hubbard, supra note 19, at 167–70.
100. WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 5, at 62.
101. Id.
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profitable advisory fee levels from price-cutting pressures.102 Moreover,
certain agency costs tend to hinder competition, belying the conclusion
that low transactions costs allow investors to fire an investment adviser
at will by moving their investment to a competing fund with a more
attractive fee structure.103
C. The Current State of Section 36(b) Litigation
Recognizing that mutual funds’ conflicted governance structure
obstructed the forces of arm’s length bargaining between mutual funds
and their investment advisers,104 in 1970, Congress amended the
Investment Company Act to add section 36(b).105 Before section 36(b)’s
inclusion in the Act, a shareholder could challenge an investment
adviser’s fee only by alleging corporate waste.106 The waste standard
required plaintiffs to show that the adviser’s services were of such
inadequate value that no person of ordinary, sound business judgment
would deem them worth what the mutual fund paid.107 Congress
102. See Freeman & Brown, supra note 72, at 655.
103. Memorandum from Chester Spatt, supra note 90, at 9–10. These agency costs
include tax disadvantages inherent in the sale of appreciated mutual fund shares and the
fact that shareholders’ choices are often limited to those mutual funds included in their
employers’ retirement plans. Id. With regard to tax implications, “[i]t has generally
been shown that investors are reluctant to sell securities that have appreciated
significantly in the past. . . . As tax appreciation increases, along with the expected tax
burden upon sale, investors are less likely to sell today even if they receive bad news
about managers.” Id. In essence, economically rational investors will not
withdraw their investments from poorly managed funds with significant capital gains
tax liabilities unless they expect the benefit from an alternative investment to outweigh
the tax disadvantages inherent in the sale of appreciated securities. One might
reasonably expect investors’ lack of knowledge regarding the quality of fund
management and the difficulty of predicting mutual fund returns to compound these
agency costs because investors cannot accurately predict the value of alternative mutual
fund investments. See id. at 9 (“[A]cademic studies find that Morningstar’s rankings are
poor predictors of future performance for all but the lowest rated funds. Investors’ lack
of knowledge about the quality of fund management may also make them less likely to
withdraw assets from poorly managed funds.”).
104. See S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 5 (1969), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897,
4901.
105. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat.
1413.
106. MUTUAL FUND REGULATION, supra note 29, § 7:2.1; see S. REP. NO. 91-184, at
5, as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4901 (“[A]dvisory contracts which are
ratified by the shareholders . . . may not be upset in the courts except upon a showing of
‘corporate waste.’”).
107. See Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 611 (Del. Ch. 1962) (“It is plaintiffs’
contention that in each of the years after 1954, the dollar amount of the annual fee was so
large that it bore no reasonable relation to the value of the advisory services then being
rendered by [the adviser]; and thus, presumably, no person of ordinary, sound business
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explicitly rejected this standard in enacting section 36(b), declaring it
“unduly restrictive.”108 Ultimately, however, the judicial interpretations
of section 36(b) improve little on the waste standard that Congress
sought to supplant.109
Following the adoption of section 36(b), courts faced with excessive
fee lawsuits consistently held that the statute incorporated the common
law concept of fiduciary duty.110 This standard implied rigorous scrutiny
for fairness, limiting an adviser’s fee to what could be considered fair
under “traditional equitable standards.”111 To prevail, plaintiff shareholders
bore the burden of demonstrating that the advisory contract was
somehow unfair to the company and its shareholders.112 Given the
amorphous nature of this fairness review, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals saw fit to delineate a clear standard for evaluating section 36(b)
claims.113
1. Gartenberg: A Flawed Framework
In 1980, individual shareholders Irving Gartenberg and Simone Andre
brought suit against Merrill Lynch Asset Management (Merrill Lynch)—
adviser to the money market fund Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust (the

judgment would deem the services worth what Fund had paid for them.”); see also
MUTUAL FUND REGULATION, supra note 29, § 7:2.1 (“Under this standard, shareholders
were required to show that the fee was ‘unconscionable’ or ‘shocking.’” (citing Acampora v.
Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963))). Conversely, “all the defendant needed to
show was that ‘any reasonable person might conclude that the deal made
sense.’” Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 125 (quoting Steiner v. Meyerson, Civ. A. No.
13139, 1999 WL 441999, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995)).
108. S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 5, as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4901.
109. See Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 139 (2008) (“[T]he federal fiduciary
standard applied in section 36(b) cases under Gartenberg is an infirm and warped legal
standard . . . . It is not an improvement on the common law of waste standard.”).
110. Angelo G. Savino, Note, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees—Too Much for Too
Little?, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 530, 543–44 & nn.115–16 (1980) (collecting cases).
111. Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807, 812 n.12 (2d Cir. 1976).
112. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1038, 1047
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (“[T]he Court must consider the ‘nature, quality and extent’ of the
services [provided] to the Fund in relation to the fee paid by the Fund.”), aff’d, 694 F.2d
923 (2d. Cir. 1982). Mere demonstration that “a better bargain was possible” did not
establish that the advisory contract was unfair. Id.
113. See Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928 (noting that the Congress that enacted section
36(b) had failed to set forth a definitive test for evaluating alleged breaches of fiduciary
duty).
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Fund)—under section 36(b).114 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that, although Merrill Lynch’s
advisory fee was irrefutably high in the abstract, the plaintiffs failed to
show that it bore anything other than a reasonable relationship to the
services Merrill Lynch had provided.115 Noting that the Fund’s trustees
analyzed a substantial amount of documentary material and engaged in
significant deliberations before approving the advisory contract, the
court concluded that the totality of the circumstances compelled a
finding in Merrill Lynch’s favor.116
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s
dismissal, enunciating the standard that courts applied in section 36(b)
actions for the next twenty-five years.117 Seizing upon language in
section 36(b)’s legislative history, the court concluded that arm’s length
bargaining did not occur in the market for mutual fund advisory
contracts.118 Thus, the court held that the test of whether an adviser’s fee
violated his section 36(b) fiduciary duty “[was] essentially whether the
fee schedule represent[ed] a charge within the range of what would have
been negotiated at arm’s-length in light of all of the surrounding
circumstances.”119 The court listed six factors to consider in evaluating
an allegedly excessive fee, including “[1] the nature and quality of
services provided to fund shareholders; [2] the profitability of the fund
to the adviser-manager; [3] fall-out benefits; [4] economies of scale;
114. Gartenberg, 528 F. Supp. at 1040. At the time, the Fund’s net assets exceeded
$19 billion. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 927. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1981,
Merrill Lynch took an advisory fee of over $39 million, id. at 931, which constituted
0.288% of the Fund’s average daily net assets, Gartenberg, 528 F. Supp. at 1040.
Merrill Lynch’s fee structure contained breakpoints, scaling the advisory fee downward
as net assets increased. Id. at 1043. Accordingly, Merrill Lynch’s fee ranged from 0.50% of
assets not exceeding $500 million to 0.275% of assets exceeding $2.5 billion. Id. As
noted by the court, 0.288% of the fund’s net assets represents the “effective rate” of the
fee when the scale is applied to the Fund’s total average daily net assets. Id.
115. Gartenberg, 528 F. Supp. at 1068. The court noted that the Fund’s explosive
growth had required Merrill Lynch to provide costlier facilities and had increased the
cost of processing redemption orders. Id.
The district court also gave significant weight to the structure of the fund, which
allowed shareholders to “terminate the relationship simply by writing a check and
redeeming at once.” Id. at 1067. For an argument that low-cost redemption of mutual
fund shares provides a check on advisory fees by facilitating competition in the mutual
fund industry, see Coates & Hubbard, supra note 19, at 162.
116. Gartenberg, 528 F. Supp. at 1064, 1068.
117. See, e.g., Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321 (4th Cir.
2001); Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., Inc., 875 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1989); Gallus v.
Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d 974 (D. Minn. 2007), rev’d, 561 F.3d 816 (8th
Cir. 2009).
118. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928.
119. Id.
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[5] comparative fee structures; and [6] the independence and
conscientiousness of the trustees.”120 Upon considering these factors,
the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of
establishing a breach of fiduciary duty.121
2. Criticism of Gartenberg
In recent years, commentators and courts alike have criticized the
Gartenberg standard for excessive fee litigation. Commentators have
argued that courts manipulate the Gartenberg factors in such a way as to
effectively prevent recovery by plaintiff shareholders without ever
creating liability on the part of the defendant advisers, thus establishing
an insurmountable burden for section 36(b) plaintiffs.122
For example, one of the Gartenberg factors requires courts to examine
the nature and quality of the services provided by the adviser in
evaluating the size of the advisory fee.123 Courts often equate above
average yields with high quality advisory services, and if a fund has
enjoyed above average yields, courts weigh the nature and quality of the
services provided as a factor in upholding the challenged advisory fee.124
The converse, however, does not hold true if a fund has suffered below
average returns.125

120. Krinsk, 875 F.2d at 409 (citing Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 929–30).
121. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 933. The court also summarily rejected the plaintiffs’
argument that the court should consider the lower fees that Merrill Lynch had charged to
administer pension funds as a criterion in evaluating mutual fund advisory fees. Id. at
930 n.3. Plaintiffs commonly make this argument in section 36(b) actions, to no avail.
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 79.
122. See Dillon, supra note 85, at 294–303 (discussing courts’ manipulation of
Gartenberg factors in investment advisers’ favor); Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 139
(“[T]he federal fiduciary standard applied in section 36(b) cases under Gartenberg is an
infirm and warped legal standard requiring scrutiny of hidden or essentially
undiscoverable data that, even if found, are subject to wildly different interpretations by
well paid and highly-credentialed experts.”).
123. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 930; accord Krinsk, 875 F.2d at 409.
124. See Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 472, 488–89 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (noting that fund enjoyed superior yields relative to other funds and suggesting
that such yields resulted from adviser’s research and trading strategies), aff’d, 875 F.2d
404 (2d Cir. 1989).
125. See Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 327–28 (4th Cir.
2001) (refusing to permit discovery in section 36(b) action when plaintiffs alleged that
fund had underperformed).
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In Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming International, plaintiffs in a section
36(b) action alleged that the investment adviser’s fee was excessive in
relation to the mutual fund’s deficient performance.126 Granting the
investment adviser’s motion to dismiss, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals refused to accept the plaintiffs’ argument that investment
advisory services resulting in below average yields necessarily had less
value than similar services provided to a better performing fund.127
Although the court did not hold that underperformance had no relevance
in evaluating the size of the advisory fee, it noted that investors assumed
some risk that their investments would not perform up to expectations.128
Comparing the Fourth Circuit’s treatment of the nature-and-quality-ofservices factor in the context of an underperforming fund to other courts’
treatment of the same factor in the context of a higher yielding fund, it
becomes clear that the Gartenberg factors allow for significant judicial
manipulation—a court can minimize the importance of those factors that
would appear to weigh against the investment adviser in order to reach
the court’s desired result.129

126. Id. at 327.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals worried that allowing the plaintiffs to
proceed to discovery upon a mere showing of underperformance would “make it possible
for other plaintiffs to state a claim in limitless actions filed under Section 36(b).” Id. at
328. Although the court’s concern was undeniably well founded in relation to actions in
which the plaintiff only submitted evidence of a fund’s deficient performance, a court
could easily apply the same analysis to a case in which the plaintiff also submitted
evidence on other Gartenberg factors.
Commentators have criticized other Gartenberg factors as incapable of reliable judicial
measurement. See Dillon, supra note 85, at 296–97 (discussing the “profitability to
adviser” and “fall-out benefits” factors); see also WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 5, at 77
(“[T]he only objectively quantifiable elements in [the Gartenberg analysis] are the
adviser’s cost and the volume of orders. Because order processing does not involve a
significant cost, and the other elements of the test are either hard to evaluate or discover,
or of little significance when discovered, the directors will naturally focus on the
adviser’s costs.”). For example, in calculating the net profits to the Fund, the court in
Gartenberg arrived at three estimates of after-tax profits ranging from $15,133,149 to
–$7,739,391. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923, 931 n.4 (2d Cir.
1982). With a $22 million dollar disparity in its estimates, the court could not
reasonably rely on profitability to hold that Merrill Lynch had charged the Fund
excessive advisory fees. Id. at 931. Compounding the problem, mutual funds jealously
guard data that would allow plaintiffs to accurately calculate profitability. Freeman et
al., supra note 3, at 131 (“Profitability is difficult to calculate, for starters, because it is
tough to obtain the raw data necessary to make the calculations. . . . To even start a
profitability analysis, a plaintiff must marshal evidence the SEC itself does not have and
says it cannot obtain.”).
Similarly, courts have struggled to measure the fallout benefits—intrinsic benefits
aside from advisory fees—accruing to the adviser as a result of its relationship with the
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3. Jones v. Harris Associates: Worse for Plaintiffs
One court has rejected the Gartenberg approach, but its reasoning
suggests that it did not do so out of concern that the Gartenberg standard
placed an undue burden on plaintiffs. In August 2004, three individual
plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Harris Associates (Harris), investment
adviser to the Oakmark family of mutual funds, alleging that Harris
received an advisory fee so disproportionate to the value of the services
it had provided as to constitute a breach of its section 36(b) fiduciary
duty.130 Ruling on cross motions for summary judgment, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois considered the
Gartenberg factors and concluded that Harris’s advisory fee fell within
an acceptable range.131
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court’s ultimate conclusion, albeit on different grounds.132 In an opinion
written by notable law and economics scholar Judge Frank Easterbrook,133
the court rejected the Gartenberg approach to section 36(b) litigation.134
The court concluded—contrary to the plaintiffs’ argument—that the
Gartenberg standard relied too little on the role of markets in regulating

mutual fund. See Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 740 F.2d 190, 193 (2d
Cir. 1984) (“Peat, Marwick Mitchell and Co. . . . concluded after a careful study that
[‘fall-out’ commission] benefits could not be reliably quantified and that an attempt to do
so would be prohibitively expensive.”). But see Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 497 F.
Supp. 2d 974, 981 (D. Minn. 2007) (noting that defendant investment adviser disclosed
fallout benefits accruing to the adviser to the mutual fund’s board of directors during the
fee negotiation process), rev’d, 561 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 2009).
130. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., No. 04 C 8305, 2007 WL 627640, at *1–3 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 27, 2007), aff’d, 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1579
(2009).
131. The district court noted that four factors compelled a finding in Harris’s favor:
(1) Harris charged funds comparable to those charged by similar funds managed by other
companies; (2) Harris disclosed all relevant information to the Funds’ trustees, who in
turn approved Harris’s fee; (3) the Funds’ fee schedule contained breakpoints resulting
from the trustees’ negotiation efforts; and (4) the Funds performed well during the
damages period. Id. at *8.
132. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627 (affirming district court’s decision and
disapproving Gartenberg approach to section 36(b) litigation).
133. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court
Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 40–61
(2004) (noting Judge Easterbrook’s status as one of the most productive and widely cited
circuit judges).
134. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d at 632 (“[W]e now disapprove the Gartenberg
approach.”).
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advisory fees. 135 Noting that the mutual fund market has grown
significantly since the 1970 Amendments,136 Judge Easterbrook posited
that the size and structure of the mutual fund market facilitate
competition, thus driving down the price of investment advisory
services.137 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals declined to
review Harris’s advisory fee and held that the responsibility to regulate
advisory fees belonged to “[t]he trustees (and in the end investors, who
vote with their feet and dollars), rather than a judge or jury.”138
The Seventh Circuit’s Harris Associates decision promises to make
shareholder recovery of excessive advisory fees under section 36(b)
even less likely.139 Although some commentators have argued that the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals simply articulated the Gartenberg
standard differently,140 others contend that the Harris Associates
approach will provide even greater protection to mutual fund advisers
who charge fees comparable to those charged by other advisers in the
market.141 Judge Richard Posner, dissenting from the Seventh Circuit’s
135. Id.
136. Id. at 633 (“Section 36(b) does not create a rate-regulation mechanism, and
plaintiffs’ proposal to create such a mechanism in 2008 cannot be justified by suppositions
about the market conditions of 1970. A lot has happened in the last 38 years.”). Between
World War II and 2002, a market of less than 100 mutual funds holding just over $1
billion in assets became a market of over 8000 mutual funds holding $6 trillion in assets.
Id. at 633–34 (citing Paul G. Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18
J. ECON. PERSP. 161, 161 (2004)). In fact, the assets of United States mutual funds have
almost doubled since 2002. INV . C O . I NST ., supra note 1, at 7 (“[U.S.-registered
investment companies] managed more than $10 trillion in assets at the end of 2008 for
93 million investors.”).
137. Seizing on the argument that freely redeemable shares facilitate competition,
Judge Easterbrook suggested that, even if sparse competition for mutual fund advisory
contracts fails to regulate advisory fees, shareholders’ ability to cheaply and easily move
their money to another fund charging lower fees creates an incentive for investment
advisors to keep their rates competitively low. See Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d at 633–34
(citing Coates & Hubbard, supra note 19, at 151).
138. Id. at 632. However, the court did not rule out the possibility that the sheer
size of an adviser’s fee, relative to fees charged by competitors for similar services,
might constitute prima facie evidence of a section 36(b) violation. Id. (“It is possible to
imagine compensation so unusual that a court will infer that deceit must have occurred . . . for
example, if a university’s board of trustees decides to pay the president $50 million a
year, when no other president of a comparable institution receives more than $2 million . . . .”).
139. See Floyd Norris, Fund Fees Revisited in Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008, at
C1 (“Anyone who finds [fund] fees unreasonably high . . . now has a much smaller
chance of getting the courts to intervene.”).
140. See Lee Anne Copenhefer et al., Seventh Circuit “Disapproves” Gartenberg,
but Is This New Approach Fundamentally Different? (May 27, 2008), http://www.
bingham.com/media.aspx?mediaID=7004 (“At the end of the day, the Harris Associates
decision articulates a standard that does not appear to be that different from the
Gartenberg standard.”); see also Martin & Lybecker, supra note 7.
141. Carter & Chao, supra note 8, at 3.
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denial of the Harris Associates plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing en banc,
expressed concern that, given the conflicts of interest inherent in mutual
funds’ governance structure, a comparability approach to section 36(b)
litigation might actually perpetuate inflated advisory fees.142
On March 9, 2009, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Harris Associates.143 The petitioners—plaintiffs below—presented
the question as “[w]hether the [Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals]
erroneously held . . . that a shareholder’s claim that the fund’s investment
adviser charged an excessive fee . . . is not cognizable under [section]
36(b), unless the shareholder can show that the adviser misled the fund’s
director who approved the fee.”144 In opposition to certiorari, the
respondent—Harris Associates—contended, inter alia, that the approach
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had adopted substantially mirrored
Although commentators expect the
the Gartenberg standard.145
Supreme Court to provide mutual funds’ boards of directors with
guidance regarding how to negotiate fairer fees,146 this Comment posits
that a structural remedy would best serve to vitiate the conflicts inherent
in mutual funds’ governance structure and foster more efficient
competition among mutual funds.147
V. A SOLUTION TO THE EXCESSIVE ADVISORY FEE PUZZLE:
DEFAULT RULES
Market forces have largely failed to protect mutual fund shareholders
from excessive advisory fees,148 and Congress’s attempt to remedy the

142. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 732 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (“The governance structure that enables mutual fund advisers to charge
exorbitant fees is industry-wide, so the panel’s comparability approach would if widely
followed allow those fees to become the industry’s floor.”), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct.
1579 (2009); see also Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 128 (“Evaluating no-bid contract
prices against other no-bid contract prices is futile.”).
143. Harris Assocs., 129 S. Ct. at 1580.
144. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., No. 08-586
(U.S. Nov. 3, 2008).
145. See Brief in Opposition at 14–21, Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., No. 08-586
(U.S. Feb. 2, 2009).
146. E.g., Jason Zweig, Can the Supreme Court Undress High Fund Fees?, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 15, 2009, at B1.
147. See supra Part IV.A–C; infra Part V.
148. See supra Part IV.B.
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problem through section 36(b) has proved ineffective.149 Given that
mutual funds’ management structure lies at the root of these problems,150
this Comment proposes that Congress and the Commission implement a
system of default rules aimed at fostering more efficient negotiations
between investment advisers and mutual funds’ independent directors, as
well as promoting price competition in the mutual fund industry.
A. Benchmarking Fees: A Penalty Default To Make
Advisers Negotiate
In order to remedy the conflicts of interest inherent in mutual funds’
governance structure, this Comment proposes that the SEC use its
rulemaking authority to impose a default advisory fee level and to
require investment advisers to reach a negotiated level of advisory fees
with directors in order to opt out of the default.151 By setting the default
advisory fee level near the low end of the market, the Commission can
successfully remedy the disparity in bargaining power that exists
between the investment adviser and the mutual fund’s board of directors
and produce advisory fee structures more in line with the fair market
value of advisory services.152
1. A General Theory of Penalty Defaults
In 1989, Professors Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner published a highly
influential article on the role of default rules as they pertained to
incomplete contracts.153 Prior to Ayres and Gertner’s article, commentators
largely theorized that legislatures should fill gaps in incomplete
contracts with “majoritarian” default terms approximating what the
parties would have agreed upon given the opportunity to negotiate.154 In

149. See supra Part IV.C.
150. See supra Part IV.A.
151. The SEC has authority to “issue . . . rules and regulations and such orders as are
necessary or appropriate to the exercise of the powers conferred upon the Commission”
under the Investment Company Act. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-37(a) (2006). Congress granted
the SEC broad authority to enforce the provisions of the Act. See id. § 80a-41; see also
id. § 80a-35(b) (conferring authority on the Commission to enforce section 36(b)’s
fiduciary duty).
152. See Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 140–41 (arguing that advisory fees
negotiated between investment advisers and their captive mutual funds do not reflect the
fair market value of advisory services).
153. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
154. See id. at 89–90, 93 (“Few academics have gone beyond one-sentence theories
stipulating that default terms should be set at what the parties would have wanted. . . .
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contrast, Ayres and Gertner proposed that efficient default rules might
actually take the form of outcomes that the parties would not have
agreed upon, thereby inducing the parties to affirmatively contract for
the terms that they would prefer.155
Ayres and Gertner posited that penalty default rules could lead to
more efficient contracting as a result of several mechanisms.156 First and
foremost, penalty default rules give at least one party an incentive to
explicitly avoid the default outcome by contracting around the default
rule—the party against whom a penalty default rule is set must reach an
agreement with the party in whose favor the penalty default rule
operates, or the default outcome prevails.157 Second, by inducing parties
to contract around the default, penalty default rules encourage the more
informed contracting party to reveal information to the less informed
party, especially if the incentive is on the more informed party to
contract around the default.158 Finally, by requiring parties to take
affirmative procedural steps in order to opt out of the default outcome,
legislatures can encourage the parties—especially the relatively uninformed
party—to reflect on the consequences of entering into the contract before
doing so.159
In recent years, commentators have adapted Ayres and Gertner’s
theory of penalty default rules to regulatory regimes, arguing that certain
regulations act as “regulatory penalty defaults” by imposing undesirable
outcomes on the regulated entity unless the default produces an

While this literature has vigorously examined what particular parties would have contracted
for in particular contractual settings, it has failed to question whether the ‘would have
wanted’ standard is conceptually sound.”).
155. Id. at 91.
156. See id. at 97–100.
157. Id. at 97. By forcing ex ante bargaining, legislatures may prevent contracting
parties from imposing costs on third parties by leaving the terms of a contract to ex post
determination by a court. Id. at 93.
158. Id. at 97–98. By promoting the production of information that the relatively
informed party might otherwise conceal, penalty default rules maximize the value
created by the contract and minimize the opportunity for the relatively informed party to
engage in rent-seeking behavior. See id. at 99–100. Although it would seem to defy
rationality to suggest that a relatively informed party would withhold information that
would increase the value created by the contract, this leaves aside the possibility that by
revealing information the relatively informed party might simultaneously increase the
value created by the contract and decrease the relatively informed party’s share of that value.
See id.
159. See id. at 123–25.
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alternative outcome acceptable to the regulator.160 Like penalty defaults
in contract law, regulatory penalty defaults can force the regulated entity
to produce privately held information, or information that the regulated
entity is best situated to obtain, in order to propose an acceptable
alternative outcome.161 Moreover, regulatory penalty defaults that take
effect at a future date force the regulated entity to propose an acceptable
alternative outcome in order to avoid the effect of the undesirable
default.162 By opting for a regulatory penalty default, rather than a
mandatory prescriptive rule, legislatures can encourage collaboration
between the regulated entity and the regulator in order to achieve
mutually desirable outcomes.163
2. Applying Penalty Defaults to Mutual Fund
Advisory Contracts
This Comment posits that the rationale motivating the application of
penalty default rules in both contract law and regulation apply equally
strongly to the mutual fund-investment adviser relationship. First and
foremost, a penalty default rule set against investment advisers will force
advisers to actually negotiate with mutual funds’ independent directors
in order to avoid an undesirably low fee schedule.164 Second, by
requiring investment advisers to negotiate with mutual funds’
independent directors, a penalty default rule will compel investment
advisers to disclose fee-related information that, to this point, advisers
have largely concealed.165

160. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 861, 869 (2006) (“Regulated entities have the option to avoid
compliance with these rules by ‘voluntarily’ undertaking a self-initiated alternative course of
action that under specified conditions may be a satisfactory substitute for the otherwise
applicable rule.”); see also IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 108–09 (1992).
161. Karkkainen, supra note 160, at 869.
162. Id. at 869–70.
163. Id. at 901–02. An example of a regulatory penalty default regime in the
environmental law context is California’s Proposition 65, which allows polluters to opt
out of potential civil liability by producing information necessary to establish regulatory
standards and cooperating with regulators to reduce toxic emissions. Id. at 871–75; see
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5–.13 (West 2006).
164. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 153, at 98 (arguing that, in the context of
incomplete contracting, a penalty default price term set against the seller encourages the
seller to negotiate to fill any price gaps).
165. See Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 131 (noting that investment advisory firms
generally refuse to produce data regarding the cost of providing services to mutual funds,
rendering judgment of advisers’ profitability virtually impossible).
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By forcing an investment adviser to reach a negotiated fee structure
with a mutual fund’s independent directors, a penalty default rule set
against the investment adviser will result in the type of arm’s length
bargaining that has remained largely nonexistent in the majority of
mutual fund boardrooms.166 As discussed in greater detail above,167 the
significant disparity between mutual fund advisory fees and pension
fund advisory fees stems in large part from the fact that pension funds
have the ability to purchase advisory services in arm’s length exchanges
in the free market.168 In contrast, mutual funds’ conflicted governance
structure has effectively allowed investment advisers to unilaterally set
their own compensation.169 By virtue of its sheer undesirability, a
statutorily mandated or a rule-mandated low level of advisory fee
approximating a penalty default rule will give the investment adviser no
choice but to come to the bargaining table and negotiate with the mutual
fund’s independent directors in order to avoid the default outcome.170
Moreover, by putting the investment adviser at an immediate
disadvantage relative to the mutual fund’s board of directors, a penalty
default rule increases the likelihood that the adviser will offer

166. See id. at 140–41 (arguing that the disparity between mutual fund and pension
fund advisory fees results from a general lack of arm’s length bargaining); cf. Charles F.
Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1067 n.154 (2004) (arguing that destabilization rights, a
concept based in part on Ayres and Gertner’s theory of penalty defaults, can force
negotiation between parties that might be otherwise reluctant to do so).
167. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
168. See Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 141. The fact that many pension fund
advisers are compensated according to incentive fee structures, through which they
receive increased compensation only if the fund performs well, provides further evidence
of the fact that pension fund advisory fees are negotiated at arm’s length. See BOGLE,
supra note 5, at 200. This type of fee structure is largely unheard of in mutual fund
management arrangements. Id.
169. BOGLE, supra note 5, at 172–73.
170. Penalty defaults give the party or parties against whose interests the default is
set an incentive to bargain around the default. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 153, at 97;
see also Karkkainen, supra note 160, at 902.
In this same vein, a penalty default set against the investment adviser will also have an
action-inducing character. See Karkkainen, supra note 160, at 869–70. A mutual fund’s
board of directors or shareholders must reapprove the investment adviser’s contract
yearly. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(2) (2006). Thus, if the investment adviser fails to propose
an alternative fee structure amenable to the mutual fund’s board of directors by the time
the directors must reapprove the contract, the potentially unprofitable default level of
advisory fees controls.
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concessions with regard to its fee structure in exchange for an escape
from the unwanted default outcome.
As a consequence of its negotiation-inducing character, a penalty
default rule set against the investment adviser will also trigger the
production of fee-related information that the adviser might otherwise
withhold.171 Although the Investment Company Act requires investment
advisers to furnish independent directors with whatever information they
need to evaluate the terms of a proposed advisory contract,172 advisers
have historically been reluctant to share raw data pertaining to the costs
of servicing mutual funds.173 Without this data, it is nearly impossible
for independent directors to determine a fee schedule that allows the
investment adviser to realize a reasonable profit, while simultaneously
reserving a fair share of gains to shareholders.174 However, under a
penalty default regime, investment advisers would have no choice but to
reveal this data in order to avoid the undesirable outcome.175 Like a
regulatory penalty default, setting the advisory fee default at a level
potentially unprofitable to the investment adviser would force the
adviser to reveal profitability and other data to the mutual fund’s
independent directors in order to secure approval for its alternative fee
schedule.176 The Commission can further ensure that the adviser
produces this information by delineating specific procedures for
contracting around the default—the Commission might require the
adviser or independent directors to explain to shareholders the basis for
any departure from the default.177 If the adviser refuses to produce this
data, the unpalatable penalty default level of advisory fees will control,
resulting in a windfall to the mutual fund at the adviser’s expense.178

171. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 153, at 97 (“The very process of ‘contracting
around’ [a penalty default] can reveal information to parties inside or outside the contract.”).
172. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2006).
173. Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 131. Even the SEC has been unable to obtain
this data. Id.
174. See BOGLE, supra note 5, at 159–60 (“[F]und managers have arrogated to
themselves an excessive share of the financial markets’ returns[] and left fund owners
with a commensurately inferior share.”); Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 131–32.
175. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 153, at 99 (“By setting the default rule in
favor of the uninformed party, the courts induce the informed party to reveal
information, and, consequently, the efficient contract results.”).
176. Karkkainen, supra note 160, at 869.
177. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 153, at 124 (“[I]f a penalty default is chosen
to encourage one party to reveal information to another, the court may want to regulate
the process of contracting around the default so that meaningful information is
conveyed.”); infra Part V.A.3.b.
178. In this regard, a penalty default level of advisory fees can be likened to Professor
Karkkainen’s example of a regulatory penalty default—California’s Proposition
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3. Designing the Default
In order to accomplish these objectives, the Commission should
structure the default in such a way as to maximize its negotiationinducing and information-producing functions. Accordingly, this Comment
proposes two potential benchmark models and suggests that the
Commission adopt procedural rules around the default in order to ensure
that investment advisers produce relevant information.
a. Benchmarking Fees
If the goal of the penalty default rule is to give a more informed
contracting party an incentive to reveal information to a less informed
party, the regulator should set the default against the more informed
party.179 Accordingly, and as the above discussion has already
presupposed, the Commission should set the proposed default fee
structure at a level unfavorable to investment advisers.180 All evidence
points to the fact that investment advisers systematically possess more
information than mutual funds’ independent directors.181 Investment
advisers frequently contract to provide portfolio management services to
mutual funds,182 whereas funds’ independent directors may have no
experience in the mutual fund industry beyond their service as board
members.183 Thus, the Commission must determine how—and by how
much—to set the default against investment advisers.
The most obvious solution would set the penalty default at a uniform
level tied to a particular market indicator, such as the average of the
65. Karkkainen, supra note 160, at 875. Under Proposition 65’s regulatory scheme, a
polluter who refuses to cooperate with regulators is exposed to potential civil liability.
Id. Similarly, under the penalty default regime proposed in this Comment, an investment
adviser who refuses to cooperate with a mutual fund’s independent directors—
the relevant regulators—will potentially receive an unprofitable level of advisory fees.
179. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 153, at 98.
180. See supra Part V.A.2.
181. See BOGLE, supra note 5, at 172–73 (suggesting that mutual funds’ disinterested
directors are “less-well-informed” than directors connected with management firms);
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 153, at 98 (“If one side is repeatedly in the relevant
contractual setting while the other side rarely is, it is a sensible presumption that the
former is better informed than the latter.”).
182. See BOGLE, supra note 5, at 172.
183. See, e.g., Krantz v. Fid. Mgmt. & Research, Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d 150, 152 n.3
(D. Mass. 2000) (discussing the qualifications of the Fidelity fund complex’s
independent directors).
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lowest decile or quintile of mutual fund advisory fees. 184 The
Investment Company Institute annually publishes average mutual fund
expense ratios, as well as data on expense ratios in the highest and
lowest deciles.185 However, these figures represent absolute expense
ratios and do not isolate the expenses associated with the portfolio
advisory function.186 Because the SEC has allowed investment advisers
to commingle administrative expense categories, a penalty default set
according to the lowest decile of mutual fund advisory fees would likely
require an accompanying rule requiring advisers to separate portfolio
management expenses from other administrative expenses in order to
function effectively.187 Moreover, a uniform penalty default rule tied to
such a variable indicator would likely entail significant monitoring costs,
as the Commission would have to annually reset the default to keep pace
with varying expense ratios.188
Alternatively, the Commission could place the onus on investment
advisers, tying the default to data that advisers already possess. In 2001,
Professors John P. Freeman and Stewart L. Brown conducted a careful
study of the mutual fund industry, focusing on mutual fund advisory
fees.189 They concluded that investment advisers routinely overcharged
mutual fund shareholders for portfolio advisory services, especially
when compared to fees that advisers charged institutional investors for
comparable services.190 As part of a comprehensive solution, Freeman
184. A decile is a division equal to one-tenth of a whole. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 298 (10th ed. 1993). A quintile is a division equal to one-fifth
of a whole. See id. at 960.
185. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 1, at 64. The average expense ratio of all equity
mutual funds is 1.46%, slightly less than twice the lowest decile’s 0.79% average. Id.
Similar information is available for free on the Internet. See, e.g., Morningstar,
http://www.morningstar.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2010).
186. See Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 112 (“Because of the way the SEC has allowed
mutual funds to blur expense definitions, it is not always easy to compare mutual fund portfolio
management fees and portfolio management fees negotiated on the free market.”).
187. See id.
188. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 1, at 62 (showing annually fluctuating mutual
fund expense ratios).
189. See Freeman & Brown, supra note 72.
190. See id. at 672 (“The gap between prices charged funds for advisory services
versus prices fetched elsewhere in the economy for those same services represents the
bill paid by fund shareholders for the advisory conflict of interest that is both the fund
industry’s hallmark and its stigma. That tab runs into billions of dollars per year.”); see
also Tom Lauricella, This Is News? Fund Fees Are Too High, Study Says, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 27, 2001, at C1 (“Using data on 1,343 domestic-stock funds from Morningstar Inc.,
the study found that mutual funds charged an average annual advisory fee equal
to 0.56% of investor assets in 1999. By contrast, 1999 survey data from a third of the
nation’s 100 largest public-employee pension funds showed they paid an average of
exactly half as much in advisory fees on 220 portfolios.”).
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and Brown proposed that the SEC use its rulemaking authority to grant
mutual fund shareholders “most favored nations” treatment.191 This
proposal would have forbidden investment advisers from charging
mutual funds more for portfolio advisory services than they charged
pension funds and other institutional investors for comparable
services.192 However, the Commission has not adopted Freeman and
Brown’s proposal, 193 despite praise from regulators and industry
insiders.194
This Comment proposes that the SEC convert Freeman and Brown’s
most-favored-nations pricing proposal into a penalty default rule. Under
a most-favored-nations penalty default regime, each investment adviser
would have its own unique default, determined by the amount the
adviser charged institutional investors for portfolio advisory services.195
Investment advisers would then bear the burden of justifying upward
departures from the default by demonstrating to mutual funds’
independent directors why they could not provide comparable
investment advice for the same price charged to institutional investors.196
This approach would likely capitalize on the penalty default’s
information-sharing character because investment advisers would need
to produce management cost and profitability data in order to demonstrate
why managing mutual fund portfolios merits higher advisory fees than
managing pension fund portfolios.
Given that investment advisers already possess the information
necessary to set their own default advisory fee levels, the most-favored-

191. Freeman & Brown, supra note 72, at 661.
192. Id.; see also Neil Weinberg, Mutual Funds’ Worst Nightmare, FORBES.COM,
Dec. 16, 2003, http://www.forbes.com/2003/12/16/cz_nw_1216mutualfunds.html.
193. See Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 150 (“The time has come for fund directors
to demand that fund advisers give fund shareholders ‘most favored nation’ treatment on
advisory fees.”).
194. See Weinberg, supra note 192.
195. By way of example, in 2002, Alliance Capital charged approximately 0.90% of
net assets to manage its captive Alliance Premier Growth Fund in 2002. Freeman et al.,
supra note 3, at 110–11. During the same period, Alliance Capital charged between
0.11% and 0.24% of net assets to manage portfolios of assets for pension funds and other
institutional investors. Id. Thus, under the proposed regime, Alliance Capital’s default
level of mutual fund advisory fees would be approximately one-quarter of the fee that it
had charged the Alliance Premier Growth Fund in 2002.
196. See id. at 110 (suggesting that the cost of providing investment advisory
services to mutual funds does not exceed the cost of providing investment advisory
services to pension funds).
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nations penalty default approach has the benefit of being selfadministering, obviating the need for an external regulator charged with
setting default advisory fee levels.197 However, with such a self-regulatory
mechanism, there exists a possibility of abuse and manipulation.
Because pension fund accounts generally represent a smaller fraction of
investment advisers’ revenue than mutual fund accounts, setting the
default at pension fund advisory fee levels may actually lead to
increased pension fund advisory fees.198 Rational investment advisers
could determine that the benefit of gaining additional ground in
negotiations with mutual funds’ independent directors outweighs the
cost of lost pension fund clients, and increase pension fund advisory fees
accordingly.
Given its likely propensity to force the production of relevant cost and
profitability data and its self-administering character, a most-favorednations methodology likely represents the most viable approach to
setting the default level of advisory fees. Although investment advisers
might abuse such a self-regulatory mechanism, this supposition ignores
the competition and arm’s length negotiation present in the pension fund
advisory contract market.199 In contrast to the mutual fund market, a
pension fund manager can terminate its dealings with a particular
investment adviser at any given time and take its business elsewhere.200
Accordingly, competitive pressures will likely deter investment advisers
from manipulating the default by raising pension fund advisory fees.
b. Setting the Ground Rules To Ensure Information Production
In addition to setting a penalty default against the investment adviser,
this Comment proposes that the Commission capitalize on the default’s

197. See id. (observing that investment advisers possess “apples-to-apples data” that
allows them to compare the fees charged institutional investors to the fees charged
mutual fund investors).
198. See BOGLE, supra note 5, at 199 (observing that the mutual funds managed by
Calpers’s investment advisers averaged seventeen times the size of the advisers’ pension
fund portfolios); Freeman & Brown, supra note 72, at 633 (“The average pension
portfolio is $443 million and the average mutual fund portfolio is $1.3 billion, roughly
three times greater. Moreover, in the largest deciles of portfolios/funds, the average
mutual fund portfolio is about six times larger than the average pension portfolio.”).
199. See Freeman & Brown, supra note 72, at 627–28 (“Investment advice is
essentially a commodity. Outside the fund industry, it is bought and sold in a much more
competitive marketplace.”).
200. Compare id. at 628 (“Investment managers are regularly hired and fired and
[institutional investors] doing the hiring enjoy the benefits of a competitive market.”),
with Freeman et al., supra note 3, at 140–41 (noting that mutual funds are generally
compelled to purchase advisory services from their adviser-sponsor).
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information-sharing character by regulating the process by which
investment advisers may contract around the default. If the purpose of
the penalty default is to encourage a more informed party to reveal
information to a less informed party, the regulator may structure the
process of contracting around the default in order to ensure the
production of meaningful information.201 By choosing a strong penalty
default that requires explicit contractual language or affirmative
procedural steps to opt out of the default outcome, legislatures can
essentially require more informed contracting parties to apprise less
informed parties of their legal rights.202 Similarly, if the penalty default
is regulatory in character, the supervisory body can require the
production of specific information in order to escape from the default
outcome.203
The Investment Company Act currently requires investment advisers
to furnish to mutual funds’ independent directors such information as is
reasonably necessary to evaluate the terms of the adviser’s contract.204
By modifying this rule in conjunction with the proposed penalty default
regime, the Commission can ensure that investment advisers come
forward with relevant cost and profitability data that, to date, investment
advisers have largely concealed.205 Specifically, this Comment proposes
that the SEC use its rulemaking authority to require that, in order to
avoid the default level of advisory fees, an investment adviser produce
detailed data to the mutual fund’s independent directors demonstrating
why the cost of servicing the mutual fund exceeds the cost of servicing
the adviser’s pension fund clients.206 Additionally, in keeping with its
objective of ensuring transparency in the advisory contract approval
process, the Commission should also require mutual fund prospectuses
to include a discussion of any decision to allow a departure from the

201. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 153, at 124.
202. See id.
203. See Karkkainen, supra note 160, at 875 (“Proposition 65[‘s regulatory penalty
default mechanism] invites polluters to contract around the penalty provision by cooperating
with regulators . . . by revealing (and if necessary by generating) information needed to
establish health-protective numerical regulatory standards . . . .”).
204. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2006).
205. See supra notes 172–76 and accompanying text.
206. In this regard, the proposed penalty default takes on a regulatory quality—it
requires the investment adviser to produce information it asymmetrically holds in order
to secure approval for an advisory fee structure in excess of the default. See Karkkainen,
supra note 160, at 869.
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default.207 These measures should have the combined effect of ensuring
that investment advisers produce relevant information and that mutual
funds’ independent directors faithfully reflect on this information in
considering any proposed divergence from the penalty default.208
4. The Penalty Default’s Advantage: Cooperation
In addition to its direct benefits of forcing negotiation and information
production, the proposed default regime will have the collateral benefit
of encouraging cooperation between mutual funds’ independent
directors and investment advisers.209 Under the proposed regime, the
Commission does not act as a direct rate regulator.210 Instead, and as
Congress envisioned in enacting the Investment Company Act, mutual
funds’ independent directors regulate the level of fees that advisers may
charge.211 The penalty default simply changes the starting point for

207. Currently, mutual fund prospectuses must include a discussion of the material
factors considered by the board of directors in approving the adviser’s contract, including:
(1) [T]he nature, extent, and quality of the services to be provided by
the investment adviser; (2) the investment performance of the fund and the
investment adviser; (3) the costs of the services to be provided and profits to be
realized by the investment adviser and its affiliates from the relationship with
the fund; (4) the extent to which economies of scale would be realized as the
fund grows; and (5) whether fee levels reflect these economies of scale for the
benefit of fund investors.
Disclosure Regarding Approval of Investment Advisory Contracts by Directors of
Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,486 [2004 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,232, at 80,632 (June 23, 2004). These factors
largely track the Gartenberg analysis. See Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., Inc., 875 F.2d
404, 409 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d
923, 929–30 (2d Cir. 1982)).
208. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (“It shall be the duty of the directors of a registered
investment company to request and evaluate . . . such information as may reasonably be
necessary to evaluate the terms of any contract whereby a person undertakes regularly to
serve or act as investment adviser of such company.”).
209. See Karkkainen, supra note 160, at 902 (arguing that regulatory penalty defaults
may be superior to prescriptive regulation).
210. In enacting section 36(b), Congress indicated that it did not desire to directly
regulate mutual fund advisory fees. See S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 6 (1969), as reprinted in
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4902 (“[Section 36(b)] is not intended to introduce general
concepts of rate regulation as applied to public utilities.”).
211. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484 (1979) (“Congress’[s] purpose in
structuring the [Investment Company] Act as it did is clear. It was designed to place the
unaffiliated directors in the role of independent watchdogs, who would furnish an
independent check upon the management of investment companies.” (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Alan R. Palmiter, The Mutual Fund Board: A Failed
Experiment in Regulatory Outsourcing, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 165, 165
(2006) (observing that Congress delegated the negotiation of advisory fees to mutual
funds’ boards of directors).

222

[VOL. 47: 185, 2010]

Nudging Mutual Fund Fees Downward
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

negotiations, giving the initial advantage to mutual funds’ traditionally
less informed independent directors.212 So long as the parties comply
with such regulations as the Commission may set for bargaining around
the default, they are free to negotiate a mutually advantageous fee
structure in excess of the default.213 Accordingly, the proposed regime
will likely foster genuine cooperation between investment advisers and
mutual fund boards of directors, preventing advisers from dominating
advisory contract negotiations to shareholders’ detriment.214
B. An Alternative Default Proposal: Make Competition Happen
Recognizing that the Commission and the mutual fund industry might
be resistant to such a sweeping reform proposal, this Comment also
offers a more reserved proposal that Congress might implement in order
to provide the parties with an introduction to the structure and efficacy of
default rules. Specifically, this Comment proposes that Congress condition
pension fund administrators’ exemption from liability under section
404(c) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act215 (ERISA) on
default enrollment in low-advisory-fee mutual funds.216
In 2008, 59% of mutual fund shareholders invested in funds through
401(k) and other defined contribution retirement plans.217 The vast
majority of plan administrators structure these defined contribution
retirement plans so that individual contributors may direct all or part of

212. See Karkkainen, supra note 160, at 902 (“Regulatory penalty defaults change
the baseline for negotiation . . . .”).
213. See id. at 901 (“[R]egulatory penalty default rules appear suitable for
adaptation to a new role—creating incentives for parties to enter into collaborative new
governance arrangements in good faith pursuit of . . . beneficial outcomes to avoid the
harsher consequences that might follow from failure to do so.”).
214. See id. at 902 (“Regulatory penalty defaults . . . make genuine cooperation
more attractive than shirking or strategic bargaining.”); Cristie L. Ford, Toward a New
Model for Securities Law Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 757, 821–22 (2005) (arguing
that cooperative new governance models of regulation can shift traditionally adversarial
processes toward collaborative reform efforts).
215. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2006). For the operation of the exemption section 404(c)
allows, see infra note 218 and accompanying text.
216. As with the penalty default regime proposed above, Congress could condition
the section 404(c) exemption’s availability on default enrollment in mutual funds that
charge in the industry’s lowest decile or quintile. See supra notes 185–88 and accompanying
text.
217. INV. CO. INST., supra note 1, at 77. Mutual funds accounted for 47% of the
401(k) market at the end of 2008. Id. at 92.
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their investments, allowing administrators to avoid potential fiduciary
liability.218 However, many individuals who participate in defined
contribution retirement plans lack sufficient investing sophistication to
adequately exercise control over their assets.219 As a result, an overwhelming
majority of individuals choose their plan’s default investment fund.220
Individuals who save for retirement through defined contribution
retirement plans are often limited to investing in those mutual funds
offered by their retirement plans.221 As a result, investors frequently do
not withdraw from mutual fund investments even in the face of high
advisory fees.222 This “stickiness” increases the transactions costs
associated with shifting assets to mutual funds charging lower advisory
fees, hindering mutual fund investors’ ability to discipline investment
advisers who charge above market fees.223
In light of this conflict, Congress and the Department of Labor—
responsible for administering ERISA—should require that defined
contribution retirement plans’ default investment funds only contain
low-advisory-fee mutual funds.224 Specifically, Congress should condition
plan administrators’ section 404(c) liability exemption on inclusion of
only low-advisory-fee mutual funds in plans’ default investment funds.
This proposal would have two primary effects. First, by automatically
enrolling individuals who choose their retirement plan’s default investment
fund, the rule would protect uninformed investors’ retirement savings

218. See DELOITTE CONSULTING LLP, ANNUAL 401(K) BENCHMARKING SURVEY 21 (2006),
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/us_consulting_hc_401ksurveyresults_020806.pdf
(indicating that 80% of responding 401(k) plan sponsors provided a statement that they
intended to comply with ERISA section 404(c) protection). Section 404(a) of ERISA
imposes a stringent standard of care on pension plan fiduciaries. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a) (2006). However, if the plan allows beneficiaries to exercise control over their
own accounts, section 404(c) exempts from liability plan administrators who would
otherwise be fiduciaries. Id. § 1104(c); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (2008). See
generally Debra A. Davis, Do-It-Yourself Retirement: Allowing Employees To Direct the
Investment of Their Retirement Savings, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 353, 356–60 (2006).
219. See Davis, supra note 218, at 367–68.
220. Id. (citing Julie Agnew & Lisa R. Szykman, Asset Allocation and Information
Overload: The Influence of Information Display, Asset Choice and Investor Experience 3
(Ctr. for Ret. Research, Working Paper No. 2004-15), available at http://escholarship.
bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1088&context=retirement_papers).
221. Memorandum from Chester Spatt, supra note 90, at 10.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 9.
224. Thus, if a defined contribution retirement plan only offered to its participants
mutual funds from one fund family, this proposal would require the plan administrator to
include in the default investment fund only those mutual funds with the lowest expense
ratios.
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from the detrimental effect of high mutual fund advisory fees.225 Given
that virtually no correlation exists between advisory fees and fund
performance, there is minimal risk that default enrollment in low cost
funds would adversely affect investment returns.226 Second, and perhaps
more importantly, requiring that defined contribution retirement plans’
default investment funds only contain low-advisory-fee mutual funds
will encourage price competition among mutual funds. Mutual funds
and their investment advisers cannot ignore the relatively large segment
of investors who invest through their retirement plans’ default investment
funds.227 Rather, this default rule will likely force investment advisers to
lower advisory fees to vie for inclusion in retirement plans’ default
investment funds, providing some palliative effect on the current lack of
price competition in the mutual fund industry.228
VI. CONCLUSION
As a result of mutual funds’ conflicted governance structure and the
associated lack of price competition, excessive advisory fees have
flourished. Moreover, a review of the case law and extant literature
demonstrates that Congress’s attempt to regulate advisory fees through
litigation has not met with success. Courts have turned the proposed
fiduciary duty standard into an onerous, insurmountable burden of proof.
Although some commentators argue that the time has come to
restructure mutual funds entirely, this Comment proposes to work within
the existing framework to affect independent director behavior and
foster the arm’s length negotiation of portfolio management contracts
that Congress sought in enacting section 36(b).229 By enacting the proposed
penalty default regime, Congress can give mutual funds’ independent

225. See BOGLE, supra note 5, at 161 (“Investing on the basis of relative costs alone,
then, fund investors would have improved their ten-year profit by 75 percent . . . .”); see
also THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 28, at 129–30 (discussing default options’ role in
protecting investors).
226. See BOGLE, supra note 5, at 160.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 217–20.
228. See supra Part IV.B.
229. See, e.g., WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 5, at 99–120 (proposing that mutual
funds be structured as management investment trusts, in which investors contract directly
with investment advisers); Palmiter, supra note 211, at 207–08 (suggesting that mutual
funds be structured without boards such that investors purchase portfolio management
services directly from the adviser).
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directors the upper hand in negotiation, fostering the type of arm’s
length bargaining Congress and the Commission intended section 36(b)
to accomplish. Given the importance of mutual funds to American
investors, Congress and the SEC should attempt to overhaul the current
Investment Company Act before they take any steps that might threaten
investors’ retirement security.
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